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Abstract
We report on work-in-progress on a new semantics for analyzing security protocols
that combines complementary features of security logics and inductive methods. We
use awareness to model the agents' resource-bounded reasoning and, in doing so,
capture a more appropriate notion of belief than those usually considered in security
logics. We also address the problem of modeling interleaved protocol executions,
adapting ideas from inductive methods for protocol verication. The result is an
intuitive, but expressive, doxastic logic for formalizing and reasoning about attacks.
As a case study, we use awareness to characterize, and demonstrate the existence
of, a man-in-the-middle attack upon the Needham-Schroeder Public Key protocol.
This is, to our knowledge, not only the rst doxastic analysis of this attack but
also the rst practical application of an awareness logic. Even though dening
the awareness sets of the agents, a task that is left unspecied in formal works on
awareness logics, turns out to be surprisingly subtle, initial results suggest that our
approach is promising for modeling, verifying and reasoning about security protocols
and their properties.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context
Security protocols describe how agents should exchange messages to achieve
security goals such as condentiality and integrity of data, or authentication of
the identity of agents in the network. Although security protocols often consist
of only a few message exchanges, designing correct protocols has been likened
to \programming Satan's computer" [2] as the protocols should work in the
presence of a hostile, powerful opponent who can read and alter messages at
will.
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A number of formal methods have been proposed for rigorously analyzing
security protocols. Some of these methods are based on specialized secu-
rity logics, such as the foundational BAN logic for authentication protocols
(see [1,5] as well as [15,17] and the other logics discussed there). The idea be-
hind these logics is to formalize the doxastic or epistemic reasoning of agents
executing a protocol. More precisely, the logics provide constructs, axioms and
inference rules for expressing the basic notions of security protocols (e.g. se-
crecy of data and \goodness" of cryptographic keys) and for describing how
the beliefs or the knowledge of the agents involved in a protocol execution
evolve as messages are exchanged.
Despite their successes in detecting protocol design aws, security logics
leave much to be desired. In particular, they suer from two major drawbacks:
(i) They are often quite limited in the kinds of analysis they support.
(ii) They often lack an appropriate semantics for the notion of belief.
To illustrate (i), observe that attacks such as the \man-in-the-middle"
attack upon the Needham-Schroeder Public Key (nspk) protocol [11] occur
when the attacker participates in two interleaved protocol executions, but
BAN (and some of its extensions) is not able to model interleaved executions
as it only considers single executions by design.
Abadi and Tuttle [1] give a semantics for an extension of BAN that con-
siders multiple executions; it is however quite unclear how to use their logic to
model the beliefs of agents in interleaved executions (especially since they do
not give applications of their logic). Most importantly, Abadi and Tuttle \give
a possible-worlds denition of belief as a form of resource-bounded, defeasible
knowledge" [1, p. 202], meaning that an agent's beliefs at an execution state
are expressed in terms of the states that are indistinguishable to him from
there, i.e. the states in which he has the same information. But, as stated in
(ii) above, this semantics and, similarly, those for other extensions of BAN,
e.g. [4,10], are unsatisfactory: an agent may reason about, and believe in, any
formula in the language, even a formula containing terms that the agent may
ignore such as the name or public key of another agent in the network. In fact,
an agent may even reason about protocol executions he is not participating
in.
An alternative way of reasoning about security protocols is to consider
protocols as sets of all possible communication traces. There are several ways
in which this idea can be formalized. For example, Paulson [14] uses inductive
denitions in higher-order logic. In his work, a protocol plus an attacker model
correspond to a set of rules expressing the observable events (i.e. exchange of
messages) that can occur in the network; the closure under such rules yields
an inductively dened set of traces modeling all the possible communications
between the agents as well as the attacker's interference. Paulson uses these
models for verication: he interactively proves, by induction, that violations
of security properties (i.e. some bad situation, such as an attacker learning
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the private key of an agent) cannot occur in any trace. Similar inductive def-
initions are used by Basin in [3], where they provide the basis for automatic,
innite-state, model-checking of protocols using lazy evaluation in the pro-
gramming language Haskell. In a nutshell, inductive methods are successful
in nding attacks in security protocols, but characterizing attacks as proper-
ties of states or traces can be tricky and require ingenuity (depending on the
particular model and the kinds of attacks one is trying to formalize).
1.2 Contribution
In this paper we report on work-in-progress on an awareness-based semantics
for the analysis of security protocols that combines complementary features
of security logics and inductive methods, as well as features of traditional
approaches to doxastic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Our goal is to obtain
an intuitive, but expressive, logic for modeling, verifying and reasoning about
security protocols and their properties.
The central ideal is that of awareness [8,9,18]. The notion of awareness
has been used to address the logical omniscience problem, i.e. the problem of
agents having unbounded reasoning power, which is a characteristic of most
doxastic/epistemic logics. Technically, awareness is a lter dening, for each
of the agents, the set of formulas he is able (and, possibly, entitled) to rea-
son about, thus limiting his reasoning power. We use awareness to model the
resource-bounded reasoning of the agents participating in security protocols
and, in doing so, capture a more appropriate notion of belief than those usu-
ally provided in security logics: while implicit belief expresses the standard,
logically omniscient notion of belief, explicit belief restricts an agent's implicit
beliefs to the formulas that he is aware of. In other words, in our approach
resource-bounded reasoning is a consequence of the possible incompleteness
of the awareness set of the agents, who are aware of a proper subset of the
logical language, implying that the formulas they explicitly believe in are a
subset of the formulas they implicitly believe in. Combining this with the in-
ductive approach allows us to formalize and reason about attacks in possibly
interleaved protocol executions in a simple and intuitive way in terms of the
awareness and beliefs of the agents.
As a case study, we formalize the nspk protocol in our logic and use
awareness to characterize, and demonstrate the existence of, the man-in-the-
middle attack shown in Fig. 1 (where \Æ" and fjM jg
K
denote concatenation
and encryption of M under K respectively; we assume familiarity with the
protocol and the attack and refer to, e.g., [11] for details). To our knowledge,
this is the rst doxastic (or epistemic) analysis of this attack, as well as the
rst practical application of an awareness logic. Even though dening the
awareness sets of the agents, a task that is left unspecied in formal works
on awareness logics, turns out to be surprisingly subtle, initial results suggest
that our approach is promising for modeling, verifying and reasoning about
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Fig. 1. The nspk protocol (left) and the man-in-the-middle attack (right)
security protocols and their properties.
1.3 Organization
We proceed as follows. In x2 we present our logic: its syntax, model of com-
putation, and its awareness-based possible-worlds semantics. In x3 we give
the rules for generating the set of formulas an agent is aware of and in x4 we
show how to use the logic to analyze the nspk protocol. We discuss related
work in x5, and in x6 we draw conclusions and discuss future work.
2 An awareness-based security logic
2.1 Syntax
Let the sets P of primitive propositions and T of primitive terms be given,
where T consists of three disjoint subsets: T
I
of agent identiers, T
K
of cryp-
tographic keys, and T
N
of nonces.
1
The sets of messages and formulas are
built as follows.
Denition 2.1 The set M of messages is the smallest set closed under the
following rules: (i) M 2 M if M 2 T ; (ii) M ÆM
0
2 M if M;M
0
2 M; and
(iii) fjM jg
K
2M if M 2M and K 2 T
K
.
The set F of formulas is the smallest set closed under the following rules:
(i) ? 2 F ; (ii) p 2 F if p 2 P; (iii) ' !  2 F if ' 2 F and  2 F ; (iv)
says
A
(B;M), sees
A
(M), has
A
(M), sec
G
(M) 2 F if A;B 2 T
I
, M 2 M, and
G  T
I
; and (v) A
A
', B
A
', I
A
' 2 F if A 2 T
I
and ' 2 F . 
The operators represent the logical consequences of the message exchange
between the agents. Intuitively, says
A
(B;M) denotes agent A's saying M 2
1
We assume an underlying algebra where (K
 1
)
 1
= K for all keys K 2 T
K
, and the
function 
 1
: T
K
! T
K
maps a keyK to its inverse keyK
 1
. We consider here (asymmetric)
public key protocols; for protocols employing (symmetric) shared keys we also have K
 1
=
K. Note also that we introduce sorts to distinguish dierent kinds of data and all the terms
have a unique sort. Although this simplies the encoding, it prevents us from modeling type-
aw attacks where, for example, an agent accepts a nonce as a session-key. An extension
to analyze this kind of attack should be possible but remains as future work.
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t 2 P X 2 synth(analz(spies(t)))
t; Spy! B : X 2 P
attacker
Fig. 2. The nspk protocol as an inductively dened set
M to agent B, sees
A
(M) denotes agent A's seeing M , has
A
(M) denotes A's
possessing M , and sec
G
(M) denotes that M is a secret known only to the
agents in the group G. The operators A
A
, B
A
and I
A
denote the awareness,
explicit belief and implicit belief of an agent A. Other operators can be
dened in the usual manner, e.g. negation :'  ' ! ? and conjunction
(' ^  )  :(:' _ : ).
We adopt the following notation: the variables A, B and C range over
agent identiers, the constant Spy 2 T
I
denotes the attacker agent, groups
of agents are denoted by G, and Greek letters denote formulas. All variables
may be annotated by subscripts or superscripts.
2.2 Model of computation
The model of computation we employ combines ideas from inductive meth-
ods for protocol verication [3,14] with ideas from security logics [1,5] and
from traditional approaches to doxastic/epistemic reasoning in multi-agent
systems [8,9,18]. More specically, we combine Paulson's model of a protocol
as an inductively dened set of traces with an appropriate notion of awareness
to formalize protocol attacks in terms of the awareness and the beliefs of the
participating agents.
From the inductive method we take the notions of event and trace: each
step of a protocol corresponds to an event, and traces are event sequences
resulting from any interleaving of (possibly partial) protocol executions.
Denition 2.2 A trace is a sequence of events, where each event is a message
exchange of the form A ! B : M . The set  of traces is dened inductively
as follows: hi 2  , and if t 2  and A ! B : M is an event, then t; (A ! B :
M) 2  where \," denotes concatenation. 
A protocol can then be modeled as a subset P   of traces. Paulson
inductively denes P in terms of the closure of a set of rules representing the
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protocol steps and possible actions by the attacker. For example, the rules
used in [14] to build the set P corresponding to the nspk protocol are given in
Fig. 2 (we adapted the syntax to be consistent with ours). These rules model
how, when the conditions above the line are met, traces are extended with the
new events below the line. The rule empty starts o the inductive denition:
the empty trace always belongs to P . The rules ns
1
{ns
3
model the identically
named steps of the protocol. In ns
2
, for example, a trace t 2 P can be extended
with B ! A : fjN
1
Æ N
2
jg
K
A
whenever N
2
has not been used in t (i.e. it is a
fresh nonce) and t contains an event A
0
! B : fjA ÆN
1
jg
K
B
(possibly resulting
from an application of the rule ns
1
, or from an application of the attacker rule).
The superscript in A
0
means that B received the message fjA Æ N
1
jg
K
B
from
some agent, but not necessarily from A. It could be any agent masquerading
as A. Hence B cannot, from this message alone, determine who sent it.
The attacker rule formalizes the attacker model of Dolev and Yao, who as-
sume the following about the attacker: \(a) he can obtain any message passing
through the network; (b) he is a legitimate user of the network, and thus in
particular can initiate a conversation with any other user; and (c) he will have
the opportunity to be a receiver to any user A" [7, p. 199]. We follow Paulson
and model these assumptions by dening in the attacker rule that the Spy can
say anything that he can synthesize from the analyzable parts of the messages
he spies from the network. The rule employs the operators synth and analz,
which, like the operator parts dened below, compute particular extensions
of a set M of messages: parts(M) is the set of all sub-messages of (the mes-
sages in) M, analz(M) consists of all the messages that can be analyzed from
M, and synth(M) contains all the messages that can be synthesized from M.
Finally, spies(t) is the set consisting of all messages that have been sent in a
trace t, which formalizes the assumption that the attacker has control over
the network.
Since we also use parts, analz and synth in our model of computation, we
provide their formal denitions as follows:
Denition 2.3 Let M be a set of messages. The set parts(M) is the smallest
extension of M obtained by adding the components of compound messages
and the bodies of encrypted messages:
M 2M
M 2 parts(M)
parts-inj
M
1
ÆM
2
2 parts(M)
M
i
2 parts(M)
parts-i (i 2 f1; 2g)
fjM jg
K
2 parts(M)
M 2 parts(M)
parts-body
The set analz(M) is the smallest extension of M closed under projection and
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decryption by keys in analz(M):
M 2M
M 2 analz(M)
analz-inj
M
1
ÆM
2
2 analz(M)
M
i
2 analz(M)
analz-i (i 2 f1; 2g)
fjM jg
K
2 analz(M) K
 1
2 analz(M)
M 2 analz(M)
analz-dec
The set synth(M) is the smallest extension of M including agent identiers
and closed under pairing and encryption:
M 2M
M 2 synth(M)
synth-inj
M
1
2 synth(M) M
2
2 synth(M)
M
1
ÆM
2
2 synth(M)
synth-pair
M 2 synth(M) K 2 synth(M)
fjM jg
K
2 synth(M)
synth-enc

From the doxastic/epistemic approach to modeling multi-agent systems
and security protocols [1,5,8,9] we take the notions of local and global state.
At any point during a protocol execution, each agent has a local state, which
represents the agent's internal, persistent information. A global state is a tuple
consisting of the local states of all the agents, including that of the attacker.
It provides an abstract snapshot of the whole system at that point (although
note that we do not model an explicit notion of time but simply consider the
\time points" generated by the sequences of events in the traces). We rst
dene the structure of a global state and afterwards explain how to construct
global states from traces.
Denition 2.4 The local state of an agent A 2 T
I
is a pair consisting of the
set of actions that A has performed and the set of messages in A's possession.
A global state w is an n-tuple of local states, where n is the number of agents
in the system including the attacker. 
The actions that an agent A can perform are sending a message M to
another agent B, in symbols Send
A
(B;M), and receiving a message M , in
symbols Rec
A
(M), where the identity of the sending agent is not know a priori
(it may be derivable in some cases, e.g., after an authentication protocol).
We now combine the notions of trace and state: we dene functions that,
given a trace, compute the local state of each agent participating in the (pos-
sibly partial, interleaved) protocol executions in that trace. The global state
is obtained by tupling the resulting local states.
Denition 2.5 Given t 2 P , the sets of actions and possessions of an agent
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A are recursively dened using the functions Ac
A
(t) and Po
A
(t) as follows:
Ac
A
(B ! C :M; evs) =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
fSend
B
(C;M)g [ Ac
A
(evs) if A = B
fRec
C
(M)g [ Ac
A
(evs) if A = C
fSend
B
(C;M);Rec
C
(M)g [ Ac
A
(evs) if A = Spy
Ac
A
(evs) otherwise
Ac
A
(hi) = ;
Po
A
(B ! C :M; evs) =
(
fMg [ Po
A
(evs) if A 2 fB;C; Spyg
Po
A
(evs) otherwise
Po
A
(hi) = initState(A)
where evs ranges over event sequences and initState is a protocol-dependent
function that returns the information that an agent possesses in an empty
trace (e.g. his private and public keys, and the public keys and identiers of
some other agents).
So, given a trace t 2 P , the local state s
A
(t) of an agent A is simply
hAc
A
(t); Po
A
(t)i, and the global state w is the n-tuple of the local states s
A
(t)
for all n agents. Given a global state w, we will (overloading notation) write
s
A
(w) to denote the local state of an agent A at w, and Ac
A
(w) and Po
A
(w)
to denote the two components of s
A
(w). 
Hence, the Spy's local state contains the actions performed by all the
agents, as well as the messages they exchange, while the local state s
A
(w) of
an agent A dierent from Spy is built only from the events that A participated
in. Note that since the Spy possesses all the messages sent in the network,
Po
Spy
(w) captures the same information as the set spies used in [14] to for-
malize the attacker's control over the network, and thus expresses Dolev and
Yao's attacker model in our setting.
In our approach we will also need to relate agents and messages at par-
ticular global states. For example, given an agent A and a message M , we
will need to compute the sub-messages of M that A can possess, or express
that A has used M
0
to build a message M . We cannot use the operators
synth and analz to capture these notions: analz, for instance, would not com-
pute that M 2 analz(ffjM jg
K
g) even if agent A had the appropriate key since
K
 1
=2 analz(ffjM jg
K
g). We thus introduce the operators submsg and comp:
submsg
A
(w;M) is the set consisting of all sub-messages that A can obtain from
M given the keys he possesses at a global state w, while the set comp
A
(w;M)
contains all the sub-messages that A used to construct the message M at w.
16
Accorsi, Basin, Vigano
Denition 2.6 The set submsg
A
(w;M) is dened as follows:
M 2 Po
A
(w)
M 2 submsg
A
(w;M)
sub-inj
M
1
ÆM
2
2 submsg
A
(w;M)
M
i
2 submsg
A
(w;M)
sub-i (i 2 f1; 2g)
fjM
0
jg
K
2 submsg
A
(w;M) K
 1
2 KeysOf
A
(w)
M
0
2 submsg
A
(w;M)
sub-dec
where KeysOf
A
(w) = fK j K 2 analz(Po
A
(w)) and K 2 T
K
g is the set of keys
that an agent A possesses at a global state w.
The set comp
A
(w;M) is dened as
fM
0
j M
0
2 analz(Po
A
(w));M 2 synth(Po
A
(w)) and M
0
2 parts(fMg)g :
Observe that both comp and submsg are nite, computable, sets. 
We will now exploit this model of computation to introduce our awareness-
based possible-worlds semantics for reasoning about agents' beliefs during in-
terleaved protocol executions.
2.3 Semantics
We begin by xing a set T
I
of agent names, where, for simplicity, we identify
its elements with the previously dened set T
I
of agent identiers; thus, from
now on we will simply talk of agents.
A subset P   of traces modeling a protocol gives rise to a model M =
(W;; ; ), where W is a non-empty set of global states (or worlds),  is an
agent-indexed family of equivalence relations on W ,  is a valuation function
 : P ! }(W ), and  is an agent-indexed family of awareness functions
 : (T
I
W )! F .
We dene how to compute 
A
in x3 below; informally, if ' 2 
A
(w) then
agent A is aware of ' at the global state w. The family of relations  captures
indistinguishability : two global states are indistinguishable to an agent A i
the local state of A is the same at these two global states. More formally,
w 
A
w
0
i s
A
(w) = s
A
(w
0
), i.e. Ac
A
(w) = Ac
A
(w
0
) and Po
A
(w) = Po
A
(w
0
).
Denition 2.7 Truth of a formula ' at a global state w in a model M =
(W;; ; ), in symbols M; w j= ', is the smallest relation satisfying:
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M; w j= p i w 2 (p); for a primitive proposition p 2 P
M; w j= '!  i M; w 6j= ' or M; w j=  
M; w j= has
A
(M) i M 2 analz(Po
A
(w))
M; w j= sees
A
(M) i Rec
A
(M
0
) 2 Ac
A
(w) and
M 2 submsg
A
(w;M
0
) for some M
0
M; w j= says
A
(B;M) i Send
A
(B;M
0
) 2 Ac
A
(w) and
M 2 comp
A
(w;M
0
) for some M
0
M; w j= sec
G
(M) i M; w j= has
A
(M) for all A 2 G and
M; w 6j= has
B
(M) for all B 62 G
M; w j= A
A
' i ' 2 
A
(w)
M; w j= I
A
' i M; w
0
j= ' for all w
0
such that w 
A
w
0
M; w j= B
A
' i M; w j= A
A
' and M; w j= I
A
'
We write M j=  i M; w j=  for all w 2W . 
In other words, at a global state w, an agent A has M iM is an analyzable
message in his set of possessions, he sees M i he received an M
0
such that
M is a readable sub-message of M
0
, and he says M to an agent B i he sent
an M
0
to B such that M was used to compose M
0
. A message M is a secret
shared among the agents in a group G at w i at w all the agents in G possess
M and there is no agent not in the group who possesses M . Furthermore, an
agent A is aware of a formula ' at w i ' is an element of the set 
A
(w),
which we dene in x3 below, A implicitly believes in ' at w i ' holds in
all the worlds indistinguishable to A from w, and A explicitly believes in a
formula ' at w i at w he is aware of ' and implicitly believes in it.
3 Awareness
Awareness denes the set of formulas that an agent is able (and, possibly,
entitled) to reason about, and thereby limits his reasoning power. Dening an
appropriate set of rules to compute 
A
(w), i.e. the set formulas that an agent
A is aware of at a world w, turned out to be surprisingly subtle. One of the
reasons for this is that there are no prior applications of awareness logics or
guidelines for generating awareness rules in the literature. More importantly,
the problem is that the awareness set will typically be not only incomplete,
meaning that it is possible that neither one of ' and :' is in the set, but also
possibly inconsistent, meaning that both ' and :' can be in the set [8,9,18].
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Moreover, awareness does not imply truth, i.e. it is not necessarily the case
that if M; w j= A
A
' then M; w
0
j= ' for some w
0
. That is, an agent might
not only be unaware of some true facts, but he might also be aware of some
contradictory or false facts.
2
While these are desirable properties, since it
is on them that we base our method for dening and nding attacks, they
make typical logical criteria (e.g. constructions based on completeness and/or
consistency) inappropriate for computing the awareness set.
Our approach to the problem of computing 
A
(w) has been to distinguish
between the dierent forms of reasoning that agents perform to become aware
of formulas, and identify means to express them. In particular, agents are
aware of the formulas representing their local states, from which they can
infer other formulas they should also be aware of. These ideas give rise to
three kinds of rules: the basic rules mirror the semantic denitions of says,
sees and has given above and thereby capture the agents' reasoning about their
own actions and possessions, while the contents of the messages are used in
the rules expressing agents' inferences about secrecy and identication. Note
that these rules generate inductively the awareness set; they are part of the
semantic denition, as opposed to being part of a deductive system.
As an example, we give now the awareness rules we used for reasoning
about the nspk protocol.
Denition 3.1 The basic rules represent the fact that agents are aware of
their local states:
Send
A
(B;M
0
) 2 Ac
A
(w) M 2 comp
A
(w;M
0
)
says
A
(B;M) 2 
A
(w)
basic
1
Rec
A
(M
0
) 2 Ac
A
(w) M 2 submsg
A
(w;M
0
)
sees
A
(M) 2 
A
(w)
basic
2
M 2 analz(Po
A
(w))
has
A
(M) 2 
A
(w)
basic
3
The secrecy rules dene how an agent becomes aware that he is sharing a
secret with another agent and how he explicitly believes in that:
says
A
(B;M) 2 
A
(w) M 2 T
N
sec
fA;Bg
(M) 2 
A
(w)
sec
1
says
B
(A;M) 2 
A
(w) sec
fA;Bg
(M) 2 
A
(w)
B
A
sec
fA;Bg
(M) 2 
A
(w)
sec
2
2
There are additional theoretical issues concerning awareness that we will consider in
more detail in future work. For instance, closure rules such as ' 2 
A
(w) ) :' 2 
A
(w)
are proposed in [8]. While such closure conditions may be suitable in other applications of
awareness logics, they seem to be undesirable for security protocols analysis, as, for example,
awareness of a secret should not imply awareness of its negation.
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The identication rules model how an agent A may use secrets to become
aware of who uttered a message (and the sub-messages of it that A can obtain):
sees
A
(M
0
) 2 
A
(w) sec
fA;Bg
(M) 2 
A
(w) M 2 submsg
A
(w;M
0
)
says
B
(A;M
0
) 2 
A
(w)
ident
1
says
B
(A;M
0
) 2 
A
(w) M 2 submsg
A
(w;M
0
)
says
B
(A;M) 2 
A
(w)
ident
2

Some remarks on the intuitions behind these rules. In the case of the nspk
protocol we only need to consider groups with two members and reason about
secrecy of nonces (since the nonces used to authenticate the agents should be
secret). In general, we could consider groups of arbitrary size and intended
secrets other than nonces. To this end, we could replace in the rule sec
1
the
premise M 2 T
N
, stating that M is a nonce, with a premise M 2 S, stating
that M belongs to some \secrecy type" consisting of the message items that
should be secret for a particular protocol, such as private or shared keys. As
it is, the rule sec
1
states that if agent A is aware that he sent a nonce to agent
B, then he is aware that it is a secret between B and himself. But he is only
aware that he explicitly believes in the nonce's secrecy when he receives it
back from B (as stated by the rule sec
2
). In contrast to the rule basic
1
, which
states that each agent is aware of what he said, the identication rules model
how nonces are used to perform authentication (via challenge and response):
in the rule ident
1
, if an agent receives a message M
0
including as a readable
sub-message a secret M shared between B and himself, then A is aware that
the message came from B. Note that, in case of an attack, A might conclude
the wrong identity of the sender. (Indeed, recall that awareness of a formula
does not imply its truth.)
In the next section we show that these rules suÆce for reasoning about
the man-in-the-middle attack upon the nspk protocol. We expect that they
will also apply to other public key protocols and that only slight changes
and additions to the secrecy and identication rules will be needed for shared
key protocols; the basic rules given above will apply to all protocols as they
mirror semantic denitions. We have already begun experimenting in this
direction. Modeling the Otway-Rees protocol [6], for example, requires groups
of agents with more than two members and dierent strategies for reasoning
about secrecy and identication: nonces and shared keys should be secrets
that are shared between more than two agents to ensure authentication and
(correct) key-distribution.
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w
2
w
3
w
4
w
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w
1
w
0
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1
ev
2
ev
3
ev
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5
Fig. 3. Sequence of events in the man-in-the-middle attack upon the nspk protocol
(ev
1
{ev
5
as in Fig. 1)
4 Case study: the man-in-the-middle attack upon the
NSPK protocol
We now give an application of our approach by showing how to use awareness
and the agents' beliefs to characterize and reason about the man-in-the-middle
attack upon the nspk protocol. As shown in Fig. 1, the attack consists of a
sequence of ve events, and Fig. 3 names the global states generated by these
events. To express the attack in terms of awareness, observe that in the single
execution of the nspk protocol in Fig. 1 the agents A and B mutually authen-
ticate each other with the help of the secret nonces N
1
and N
2
. According to
Lowe [11], the attack is not upon A, as he voluntarily starts the protocol with
Spy, but it is upon C, who is tricked into concluding that he is communicating
with A instead of Spy.
3
We can represent this in terms of the secrecy of N
2
as follows: after the second event Spy! C : fjAÆN
1
jg
K
C
, C generates N
2
as a
challenge-response secret nonce between himself and the agent whose identity
is bound to the nonce N
1
, i.e. A, and not between himself and the agent who
actually initiated the protocol with him, i.e. Spy. As a result of his own action,
after the third event C ! A : fjN
1
Æ N
2
jg
K
A
, C is aware of N
2
being a secret
between A and himself, which amounts to A
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) holding at w
3
, w
4
and w
5
. If C were however able to consider the attack sequence, at the end of
it he would not implicitly believe in the secrecy of N
2
, since his challenge has
been responded to but the nonce is now possessed also by Spy.
Let now M be a model generated by a subset P   of traces modeling
the nspk protocol. M then contains the worlds w
0
{w
5
of Fig. 3, and we can
express the man-in-the-middle attack by proving that
M 6j= A
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
)! I
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) : (1)
That is, there is at least one world inM at which C is aware that N
2
is a secret
he shares with A but he does not implicitly believe in this, which implies that
M 6j= B
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
), i.e. that C does not explicitly believe in the secrecy of
his own secret nonce.
Proof of (1): We begin by computing the global state w
5
, where, for sim-
3
Note that A does not know that he is executing the protocol with an attacker; indeed,
Spy could just be a previously honest agent now turned bad or could represent an honest
agent whose private key has been compromised. Moreover, note that one could argue that
also A is attacked, as the Spy uses his nonce N
1
to masquerade as him to C. That A
wrongfully assumes N
1
to be a secret between himself and the Spy can also be shown using
our approach.
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plicity, we only show the primitive terms that the agents possess:
s
A
(w
5
) =
8
>
>
<
>
:
Po
A
(w
5
) = fA;K
A
;K
 1
A
; Spy;K
Spy
; N
1
; N
2
g
Ac
A
(w
5
) = fSend
A
(Spy; fjA ÆN
1
jg
K
Spy
);Rec
A
(fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
);
Send
A
(Spy; fjN
2
jg
K
Spy
)g
s
C
(w
5
) =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
Po
C
(w
5
) = fC;K
C
;K
 1
C
; A;K
A
; N
1
; N
2
g
Ac
C
(w
5
) = fRec
C
(fjA ÆN
1
jg
K
C
); Send
C
(A; fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
);
Rec
C
(fjN
2
jg
K
C
)g
s
Spy
(w
5
) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
Po
Spy
(w
5
) = fSpy;K
Spy
;K
 1
Spy
; A;K
A
; C;K
C
; N
1
; N
2
g
Ac
Spy
(w
5
) = fRec
Spy
(fjA ÆN
1
jg
K
Spy
); Send
Spy
(C; fjA ÆN
1
jg
K
C
);
Rec
Spy
(fjN
2
jg
K
Spy
); Send
Spy
(C; fjN
2
jg
K
C
)g
[ Ac
A
(w
5
) [ Ac
C
(w
5
)
where initState(A) = fA;K
A
;K
 1
A
; Spy;K
Spy
g, initState(C) = fC;K
C
;K
 1
C
g
and initState(Spy) = fSpy;K
Spy
;K
 1
Spy
; A;K
A
; C;K
C
g.
We now show that awareness and belief allow us to characterize the at-
tack at the end of the event sequence. That is, we show that M; w
5
j=
A
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) and M; w
5
6j= I
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
), which implies (1). By de-
nition, M; w
5
j= A
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) i sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) 2 
C
(w
5
), which holds since
Send
C
(A; fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
) 2 Ac
C
(w
5
) N
2
2 comp
C
(w
5
; fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
)
says
C
(A;N
2
) 2 
C
(w
5
)
basic
1
and
says
C
(A;N
2
) 2 
C
(w
5
) N
2
2 T
N
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) 2 
C
(w
5
)
sec
1
where the only sub-goal that does not follow directly by assumption or from the
local state of the agent C is N
2
2 comp
C
(w
5
; fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
), which by denition
of comp holds i (i) N
2
2 analz(Po
C
(w
5
)), (ii) fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
2 synth(Po
C
(w
5
)),
and (iii) N
2
2 parts(ffjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
g). Sub-goals (i) and (iii) follow from
N
2
2 Po
C
(w
5
)
N
2
2 analz(Po
C
(w
5
))
analz-inj
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and
fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
2 ffjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
g
fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
2 parts(ffjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
g)
parts-inj
N
1
ÆN
2
2 parts(ffjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
g)
parts-body
N
2
2 parts(ffjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
g)
parts-2
and (ii) follows from
N
1
2 Po
C
(w
5
)
N
1
2 synth(Po
C
(w
5
))
synth-inj
N
2
2 Po
C
(w
5
)
N
2
2 synth(Po
C
(w
5
))
synth-inj
N
1
ÆN
2
2 synth(Po
C
(w
5
))
synth-pair
and
N
1
ÆN
2
2 synth(Po
C
(w
5
))
K
A
2 Po
C
(w
5
)
K
A
2 synth(Po
C
(w
5
))
synth-inj
fjN
1
ÆN
2
jg
K
A
2 synth(Po
C
(w
5
))
synth-enc
Hence, M; w
5
j= A
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
), i.e. at w
5
agent C is aware that N
2
is a
secret between A and himself. To show that he does not implicitly believe
in it, i.e. that M; w
5
6j= I
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
), observe that by denition M; w
5
j=
I
C
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) i M; w
0
j= sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
) for all w
0
such that w
5

C
w
0
. Since
w
0
can only be w
5
by the denition of 
C
, we check whether M; w
5
j=
sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
), which holds i M; w
5
j= has
i
(N
2
) for all agents i 2 fA;Cg,
andM; w
5
6j= has
j
(N
2
) for all agents j 62 fA;Cg. Since j can only be Spy and
M; w
5
j= has
Spy
(N
2
), it follows that M; w
5
6j= sec
fA;Cg
(N
2
), and we conclude
the proof. 
In [11], Lowe also shows how to x the nspk protocol to avoid the man-
in-the-middle attack. The solution is simply to include the identity of the
responder B in the second step of the protocol, i.e. to replace ns
2
by ns
0
2
=
B ! A : fjB Æ N
1
Æ N
2
jg
K
A
so that an attempted attack stops after ev
3
since
A will not reply to B's message as B is not the agent with whom A has
started the protocol with the nonce N
1
. It is straightforward to show that in
the corrected version of the protocol we have M j= B
B
sec
fA;Bg
(N
2
), i.e. the
protocol is correct with respect to the explicit beliefs of a responder B, which
rules out this attack.
We can straightforwardly generalize the insights obtained from this case
study as follows. Let M be a model generated by a subset P   of traces
modeling an authentication protocol, where authentication is realized in terms
of secret nonces. The protocol can be attacked, meaning that the secrecy of
some nonce N can be violated whenever for some agent A there is an agent
B such that
M 6j= A
A
sec
fA;Bg
(N)! I
A
sec
fA;Bg
(N) :
This formula represents (an agent's view of) an attack upon the secrecy of
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the nonces used for authentication, as in the nspk and in a number of other
public and shared key protocols. As we mentioned in the previous section, we
can generalize our awareness rules by introducing a secrecy type to capture
secrets other than nonces, but this is but a rst step towards generality. Au-
thentication can be dened (and realized) in dierent ways [12] and there are
several other security properties that are implemented by security protocols,
such as condentiality and integrity of data. We are currently working on
extending our approach to analyze these properties and, more generally, on
characterizing the class of attacks upon these properties that can be expressed
in terms of awareness.
5 Related work
In the introduction we surveyed some of the related work to place our work in
context. We now expand on this and compare our work in more detail with
other approaches to giving semantics for authentication logics. To this end,
let us rst briey review these works.
The GNY logic of Gong, Needham and Yahalom [10] was the rst exten-
sion of the BAN logic. Its semantics is close to that of BAN, i.e. an opera-
tional semantics where the local state of an agent consists of a set possessions
and a set of formulas he believes in.
Abadi and Tuttle [1] dene a possible-worlds semantics for the logic AT,
which is an extension of BAN that considers multiple executions of a protocol.
Although the logic lacks an explicit notion of awareness, the hide operator
provides a basis for a weak form of \belief as a form of resource-bounded,
defeasible knowledge" [1, p. 202], and thereby captures some of the notions
that our use of awareness makes explicit. Technically, the hide operator is
introduced to model the assumption of perfect cryptography; the idea is to
conceal the contents of unreadable encrypted messages that an agent possesses,
thus preventing him from believing that a message contains information he
does not (or is not yet ready to) understand.
In [17], Syverson and van Oorschot give the logic SVO, which combines
features of the GNY and AT logics with additional notions such as key agree-
ment. The SVO logic has a possible-worlds semantics that is close to the
semantics given in [1], but hiding is replaced by a more rened notion of com-
prehension, which is closely related to our awareness: each agent is equipped
with a set of comprehended messages, which can be intuitively seen as the
set of messages that the agent \can ultimately tie back to cleartext he has
seen" [17, p. 20].
Kessler and Wedel [19] extend SVO to the logic AUTLOG in which
resource-bounded reasoning is captured by means of the sight operator, which
performs a task similar to Syverson and van Oorschot's comprehension.
To summarize, the above illustrates how notions close to resource-bounding
and awareness have been implicitly modeled in a number of previous ap-
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proaches to giving a semantics for BAN or its descendants. The major novelty
of our approach is that awareness is the heart of the matter, i.e. we take aware-
ness as the explicit, central concept, and use it to model and reason about the
agents' resource-bounded reasoning and attacks in possibly interleaved proto-
col executions. As a further comparison, note that the logics BAN, GNY,
AT, SVO and AUTLOG all share the view that a system's engineer would
have of the system, meaning that belief is ascribed to the agents by an exter-
nal observer, instead of being developed internally by the agents themselves,
which is what we capture in our approach.
6 Conclusions and further work
We have reported on work-in-progress on an awareness-based semantics for
the analysis of security protocols that combines complementary features of
security logics and inductive methods, and as an example we have showed
how to model the man-in-the-middle attack upon the nspk protocol. Aside
from the characterization questions mentioned at the end of x4, current work
includes: (i) the formalization of a deduction system for our approach, possibly
a Gentzen-style or tableaux-style one to ease its usability and mechanization,
(ii) the investigation of the metatheoretic properties of the deduction system,
such as its soundness and completeness with respect to the semantics we have
given here, and its computational complexity, and (iii) the mechanization of
our logic using the generic theorem prover Isabelle [13], which will allow us not
only to machine-check our proofs but also to investigate possible combinations
of our approach with Paulson's inductive method, which employs the Isabelle
encoding of higher-order logic.
As we remarked above, we are also currently working on applying our
method to analyzing other security protocols, and thereby investigate the ex-
pressiveness of our semantics and lay the foundations for a more detailed
comparison with other related approaches. The analysis of other protocols,
such as the Otway-Rees protocol, will require us to consider groups of agents
with more than two members, and here we also intend to explore the con-
nections with standard notions of groups of agents [9,16]. It will also require
us to devise additional awareness rules and possibly modify the secrecy and
identication rules we have given here (e.g. to consider the agents' nested and
mutual, or second-level, beliefs). Our research will in particular be aimed at
developing more principled ways of devising these rules.
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